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A.  Introductory Remarks 
 
This contribution will contain an analysis of important European dynamics, 
particularly at this moment when it seems to be necessary to restart the process of a 
unified European identity, which was, in a way, compromised after the failure of 
the EU Constitution1 and the difficulty of giving effectiveness to democracy:2  
 
the EC professes democracy without being 
democratic. Thus the fragility of its political 
institutions, inherently perilous, necessarily 
reflects on the legitimacy of its legal order, while 
the constitutional balance intrinsic to the 
separation of powers ideal is dangerously absent. 
In other words, while in every Member State, the 
administrative law system forms part of a working 
system, this is not the case in the Community.3 
                                            
* PhD, University of Pavia. Visiting researcher at the Max Planck Institut für ausländisches und 
öffentliches recht und Völlkerrecht, Heidelberg, email: margherita.poto@unito.it. I am grateful to Prof. 
A. von Bogdandy, Director of Max Planck Institute and to  Prof. Tony Prosser, School of Law, Bristol, for 
helpful comments. 
1 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), commonly referred to as the European 
Constitution, is an international Treaty intended to create a constitution for the European Union. Despite 
its name, it only covers the European Union. It was signed in 2004 by representatives of the Member 
States of the Union but was subject to ratification by all member states which has, to date, proved 
impossible to obtain. The constitutional treaty was signed by representatives of the Member States on 
October 29, 2004 and was in the process of ratification by the Member States until  2005 when French 
(May 29) and Dutch (June 1) voters rejected the Treaty in referenda. Had it been ratified, the Treaty 
would have been entered into force on November 1, 2006, but this is now impossible. 
2 For an analytical examination of the democratic deficit in Europe, see D. BEACH, THE DYNAMIC OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: WHY AND WHEN EU INSTITUTIONS MATTER (2005).  In particular, see page 258. 
3 C. Harlow, European Administrative Law and the Global Challenge, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 266 (P. 
Craig & G. de Burca eds., 1999). 
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One of the possible causes of this fragility has been found in the opposing 
tendencies which presently cross Europe. Over the past few decades, as has been 
observed, two separate and apparently contradictory trends have occurred in the 
development of a European system:  
 
the first reflects the internationalization or 
globalization of government in certain spheres, 
with an increasing number of issues being 
allocated to or addressed by international and 
supranational levels of authority; […] a second 
trend, at least within western political systems, is 
that of localization, in the sense of an emergence of 
stronger local and regional politics, with a 
renewed interest in more direct democratic 
participation under the influence of republican and 
communitarian political theories.4  
 
Consequently, a sort of “third trend,” maybe more latent and invisible, but all the 
same considerably strong, might be recognized within the context of the decreasing 
centrality of the State, addressing the dissolution of boundaries between private 
and public spheres of regulation and control: “it concerns the evolution […] of a 
concept of governance which transcends the more traditionally conceived 
private/public divide and which challenges previous […] assumptions about the 
locus of political and economic authority.”5  
 
The trends toward internationalism, regional politics and vanishing barriers 
between the public and private domains are therefore guidelines to follow when we 
want to find solutions to the lack of democratic participation in the EU. And, of 
course, the main hurdle then becomes ways to reconcile these solutions. A first 
answer to this question can be found through a reading of European subsidiarity 
and proportionality principles, by analyzing them from both a normative and a 
case law perspective.  
 
For this purpose, the above-noted principles can be considered a good connection 
between globalization and decentralization. Moreover, these principles can be 
considered as an initial response to overcome public and private barriers insofar as 
                                            
4 G. de Burca, Reappraising Subsidiarity’s Significance after Amsterdam, HARVARD JEAN MONNET WORKING 
PAPER, 7/99, (2000). 
5 Id. 
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they regulate the intervention not only of European institutions and Member States, 
but also of other institutions public and private, and of citizens as well. Both 
concepts will be analyzed in the following paragraphs in order to understand their 
nuances and the effectiveness of their application. 
 
B. The Subsidiarity Principle, the Role of National Parliaments and the New 
Control of  Proportionality 
 
Subsidiarity was enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty in Article 3b6. It guaranteed, as 
a basic principle of the performance of the European Community, the prior right to 
act to the lower levels of governments, all the while implicitly determining a space 
for the activity and the expansion of EC competencies. In order to give substance to 
the prior participation of lower-level governments, the role of national Parliaments 
has been highlighted, connecting the subsidiarity principle with the legitimacy of 
power.7  In easing the tensions between the EU and decentralized levels, 
subsidiarity played a precise role and was thus duly enshrined in the new Treaty as 
a fundamental precept of EC law. Hence, the emphasis given by the Protocol 
annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 affirmed the application of subsidiarity 
and the related concept of proportionality as key elements of democratic legitimacy 
and flexibility.8 
 
In this sense, it is also worth noting that the European Constitution, although it has 
not entered into force,9 contains several applications of the principle, recalling its 
role as a pillar in a “healthy” democracy. For instance, Article 1-47, titled “The 
Principle of Participatory Democracy” is to provide:  
                                            
6 Article 3b: “The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty 
and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this 
Treaty.” 
7 R. Macrory and S. Turner, Participatory Rights, Transboundary Environmental Governance and EC Law, 39 
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW (C.M.L. REV.) 489 (2002). See also I. Cooper, The Watchdogs of Subsidiarity: 
National Parliaments and the Logic of Arguing in the EU, 44 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 281 
(2006). 
8A. G. Toth, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, 29 C.M.L. REV. 239 (1992). For recent 
writings on subsidiarity, see N. W. Barber, Subsidiarity in the Draft Constitution, 11 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 
197 (2005), and N.W. Barber, The limited modesty of Subsidiarity, 11 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 308 (2005). 
The principle can be found then in canon law: see A. Dashwood, The Relationship Between the Member 
States and the European Union/European Community, 41 C.M.L. REV. 366 (2004). 
9 For this aspect see, more properly, note 4. 
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1. The Institutions shall, by appropriate means, 
give citizens and representative associations the 
opportunity to make known and publicly 
exchange their views in all areas of Union action. 2. 
The Institutions shall maintain an open, 
transparent and regular dialogue with 
representative associations and civil society. 3. The 
Commission shall carry out broad consultations 
with parties concerned in order to ensure that the 
Union’s actions are coherent and transparent. 
[…].10  
 
Moreover, another interesting mechanism, unfortunately up to now in name only, 
is the so called “early warning system” (EWS), featured by the Protocol in the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, annexed to the 
Constitutional Treaty.11 In this procedure, the Commission would send each new 
legislative proposal directly to national Parliaments for their consideration: 
  
Article 4. The Commission shall forward its draft 
European legislative acts and its amended drafts to 
national Parliaments at the same time as to the 
Union legislator. The European Parliament shall 
forward its draft European legislative acts and its 
amended drafts to national Parliaments. Upon 
adoption, legislative resolutions of the European 
Parliament and positions of the Council shall be 
forwarded by them to national Parliaments.12  
 
The introduction of principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as leading criteria 
to evaluate the draft legislative act is then mentioned at Article 5: “Draft European 
legislative acts shall be justified with regard to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality […].”13And, of course, it is necessary to provide “a detailed 
statement making it possible to appraise compliance with the principles of 
                                            
10 Art. 1, European Constitution. 
11 2. Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, 16 December 2004, 
Official Journal of the European Union, C310/207, available at www.eur-lex.europa.eu. 
12 Art. 4, European Constitution. 
13 Art. 5, European Constitution 
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subsidiarity and proportionality.” Article 5 contains as well some guidelines to be 
followed in providing the statement; in particular, it should contain “some 
assessment of the proposal’s financial impact and, in case of a European framework 
law, of its implications for the rules to be put in place by Member States, including, 
when necessary, the regional legislation.”14  
 
If the national Parliament decides that a measure would violate subsidiarity, it can 
submit a “reasoned opinion” to the Commission, whose task is to formally review 
whether one third of all the votes allocated by National Parliament objects to that 
measure (Article 7).15  
The final part of this procedure gives jurisdiction to the Court of Justice to hear 
actions for annulment brought by any Member State for a violation of the principle 
of subsidiarity: 
  
Article 8. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union shall have jurisdiction in actions on grounds 
of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a 
European legislative act, brought in accordance 
with the rules laid down in Article III-365 of the 
Constitution of Member States, or notified by them 
in accordance with their national Parliament or a 
Chamber of it.16  
 
Some authors point out that the benefits derived from this mechanism, if only it 
were in force, would include the possibility of improving compliance of EU 
regulations and of alleviating the “democratic deficit.”17 However, it is noted that in 
any case, there is one important element missing: “it empowers national 
Parliaments to review EU legislation for conformity with subsidiarity but not with 
proportionality, its ‘sister principle.’18 On closer inspection, this omission is shown 
not only to be flat-out illogical, but also likely to inhibit the kind of argument that 
would make the EWS effective.”19  
 
                                            
14 See A. Peters, European Democracy after the 2003 Constitution, 41 C.M.L. REV. 37, 61 (2004). 
15 Art. 7, European Constitution. 
16 Art. 8, European Constitution. 
17 Cooper, supra note 7. 
18 Id. at 279. 
19 Cooper, supra note 7. 
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At present, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and the new 
mechanisms conceived to reinforce them have been analysed from the normative 
point of view; in the next section, their effectiveness will been examined through 
some examples taken from EU case law. Nevertheless, the doubt remains the same: 
may an “ex ante verification” of subsidiarity, committed to national Parliaments, 
revive the feeble European breath of democracy? The decisive deficit of democracy 
is, in my opinion, something difficult to eradicate, for it is intrinsically a part of the 
system itself. It has been acutely observed that in Europe  
 
there is no feeling of being a nation. There is no 
European public opinion, except perhaps among 
the narrow élite who actually run the Community. 
If there was a European Government responsible 
to the European Parliament, voters would feel just 
as alienated as they do at present. Each nation 
would regard itself as being in a permanent 
minority: there would be no sense of belonging. 
Voters would not feel that the European President 
or Prime Minister speaks for them: they would not 
regard the European Government as their 
government. This is the dilemma of European 
democracy.20 
 
 
C. ECJ, Grand Chamber, 12 July 2005, Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04: Are 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality Really Instruments for Decentralization? 
 
In the case decided by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), Grand Chamber, on 12 
July 2005, the main characteristics of subsidiarity and proportionality were well 
exemplified and, at the same time, the attitude of the Court towards the principles 
clearly emerged. And so, before briefly analyzing the framework of the decision, it 
is worth noting its full compliance with the general trend of the Court of Justice 
case law. In this regard, it has been pointed out that: 
 
while the justiciability of the principle cannot any 
longer be doubted, the case law indicates equally 
clearly that an annulment of a measure on the 
grounds that it offends subsidiarity is likely to 
                                            
20 T. C. HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 21 (1999), explaining this has been 
pointed out by a number of writers, for example A. Dashwood, States in the European Union, 23 
EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW 201 (1998).  
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occur only in extreme circumstances. The Court of 
Justice is understandably reluctant to apply in a 
robust way a principle which is so heavily 
political.21  
 
In other words, the author outlines how difficult is the judges’ task, who are called 
upon to manage such a delicate and political matter. 
 
The case concerned the validity of Articles 3, 4, and 15, of Directive 2002/46/CE of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of June 2002 on the approximation of 
the laws of the Member States relating to food supplements. According to the 
preamble to the directive, there are an increasing number of products marketed in 
the Community as foods containing concentrated sources of nutrients and 
presented as supplements to the normal diet for the intake of those nutrients. In 
order to ensure a high level of consumer protection and to facilitate consumer 
choice, products must be safe and bear appropriate labelling to be put on the 
market. This should have been the task of Member States: to bring into force the 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this 
Directive by July 2003. 
 
The claimants (two trade associations representing around 580 companies, the 
majority of which were firms which distributed dietary products in the United 
Kingdom) maintained that the provisions of the Directive were incompatible with 
Community law and, consequently, had to be declared invalid. The infringement 
upon the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality were among the reasons 
cited for the Directive’s invalidity. In both cases, the claimants submitted that the 
provisions interfered with the power of Member States in a sensitive area involving 
health, social, and economic policy.  
 
However, the Court firmly disagreed with this construction, noting on the contrary 
the definition of subsidiarity provides “that the Community, in areas which do not 
fall within its exclusive competence, is to take action only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved by the Community.”22 
 
 Moreover, the Court added that Paragraph 3 of the Protocol annexed to the Treaty, 
states that the principle of subsidiarity does not call into question the powers 
                                            
21 Dashwood, supra note 8 at 368. 
22 C. ECJ, Grand Chamber, 12 July 2005, Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, para. 101. 
842                                                                                               [Vol. 08  No. 09  G E R M A N  L A W  J O U R N A L
conferred on the Community by the Treaty, as interpreted by the Court of Justice. 
Hence, the ECJ concluded that:  
 
the principle of subsidiarity applies where the 
Community legislature makes use of Article 95 EC, 
inasmuch as that provision does not give it 
exclusive competence to regulate economic activity 
on the internal market, but only a certain 
competence for the purpose of improving the 
conditions of its establishment and functioning by 
eliminating barriers to free movement of goods 
and the freedom to provide services or by 
removing distortions of competitions.23  
 
Thus, the reason behind the prohibition on marketing food supplements that do not 
comply with Directive 2002/46 may be found, according to the Court, in the 
objective of removing barriers resulting from differences between the national 
rules, whilst ensuring a high level of human-health protection. Briefly, to leave 
Member States the task of regulating trade in food supplements, which do not 
comply with Directive 2002/46 “would perpetuate the uncoordinated development 
of national rules, and consequently, [an] obstacle to trade between Member 
States.”24 The objective pursued by Article 3 cannot be satisfactorily achieved by 
Member States and could be better achieved at Community level. Furthermore, the 
Court affirmed that no infringement upon the proportionality principle would be 
recognized, because the measures of Directive 2002/46 are “appropriate for 
achieving the intended objectives.”25 This decision does not differ from the opinion 
                                            
23 Id., para. 103. The leading case is Case C-491/01, Queen v. Secretary of States for Health (ex parte British 
American Tobacco [Investments] Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd.), 2002 E.C.R. I-11453. See, moreover, O. 
Fiumara, La nuova normativa comunitaria sulla lavorazione, presentazione e vendita dei prodotti del tabacco 
(direttiva 2001/37/CE), RASSEGNA DELL'AVVOCATURA DELLO STATO 34 (2002); M. Selmayr, H.G. Kamann & 
S. Ahlers, Die Binnenmarktkompetenz der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, EUROPÄISCHES WIRTSCHAFTS UND 
STEUERRECHT (E.W.S.) 49 (2003). For a complete framework concerning the proportionality principle in 
foodstuff matters, see also F. Spagnuolo, Il principio di proporzionalità come parametro di legittimità nelle 
sentenze della Corte di Giustizia sulle normative nazionali relative alla circolazione delle merci e alla tutela dei 
consumatori, RIVISTA IT. DIR. PUBBLICO COM 1544 (2003). 
24 C. ECJ, Grand Chamber, 12 July 2005, Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, para. 106. 
25 The case law addressing the proportionality principle and its interactions with the precautionary 
principle is copious. For a detailed comment on it, see K. Lenaerts, “In the Union we trust”: Trust-
Enhancing Principles of Community Law, 41 C.M.L. REV. 317 (2004), which cites Case-180/96, United 
Kingdom v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2265; Case C-352/98, P. Laboratoires pharmaceutiques Bergaderm v. 
Commission, 2000 E.C.R. I-5291; Case C-3/00, Denmark v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. I-2643. See also P. 
Dabrowska, GM Foods, Risk, Precaution and Internal Market: Did Both Sides Win the Day in the Recent 
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of Mr. Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 5 April 2005 in another case 
involving the Directive:  
 
[T]he question therefore is whether the objective of 
the Directive could be better achieved at 
Community level. […] [T]he Directive's objective is 
to eliminate barriers to intra-Community trade in 
food supplements raised by existing differences of 
national rules regarding the composition, 
manufacturing specifications, presentation or 
labeling of food, whilst ensuring a high level of 
health and consumer protection in accordance with 
Article 95(3) EC. Such an objective cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States 
individually and calls for action at Community 
level, as is also demonstrated by the many 
complaints received by the Commission and by the 
case-law of the Court.26  
 
In this sense, European judges continue to provide an interpretation perfectly in 
accordance with previous case law,27 from which emerges the caution of the Court 
in employing principles, so heavily political, under the cover of coordination of 
development.  
 
It is remarkable how attentive the Court of Justice is to not invading the political 
sphere of subsidiarity, the boundaries of which are traced by Art. 3b ECT. As such, 
there are reasons to doubt the apprehension about the Court of Justice’s role and 
the connected risk of a “judicialization” of the concept. 
 
If the disaffection of large parts of the European citizenry toward the European 
integration process is surely based on the lack of perceptible political issues,28 it will 
                                                                                                                
Judgement of European Court of Justice? 5 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 151 (2004), available at 
www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=383.  
26 In 2005 E.C.R.I-1135, paras. 93-95. 
27 Ex multis, Judgment of the Court of 13 May 1997, Case C-233/94, Federal Republic of Germany v. 
European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 1997 E.C.R. I-012405. See the case note of M. Dreher 
and K. Newmann, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN ZUM WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 159 (1997). 
28 T. Koopmans, Subsidiarity, Politics and the Judiciary, 1 EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 115 
(2005). 
844                                                                                               [Vol. 08  No. 09  G E R M A N  L A W  J O U R N A L
not be cured by keeping down judicial power.29 If it is true that integration is based 
also on a citizen’s trust in politics, this might not be undermined by the  
intervention of the judiciary, which, on the contrary, tends to be more objective and 
technical in verifying the effectiveness of the principles in the EU Treaty.30 
 
D. Some Remarks on Possible Means to Give Effectiveness to Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality Principles 
 
The stagnant situation which Europe seems to have fallen into in the last few years 
has attracted discussions from two opposite poles concerning the most suitable 
model to address it: integration theory on the one hand, and democratic theory on 
the other.31 Scholars have observed that: 
  
integration theory and democratic theory both 
have an important role to play in our 
understanding of the nature of the Community. 
We should not, however, ignore the lessons which 
one might have for the other. Theories of 
integration are often premised, explicitly or 
implicitly, on assumptions about human 
motivation and preferences which have significant 
implications for issues of democracy and 
legitimacy. Our very concerns with democracy and 
legitimacy cannot be considered in isolation from 
the integration forces which have generated and 
shaped the Community. The debate about the 
nature of the Community will doubtless continue, 
as it properly should. It will be all the richer if the 
                                            
29 See D. U. Galetta and D. Kröger, Giustiziabilità del principio di sussidiarietà nell’ordinamento costituzionale 
tedesco e concetto di “necessarietà” ai sensi del principio di proporzionalità tedesco e comunitario, RIV. ITAL. DIR. 
PUBBLICO COM. 928 (1998). See also R. CARANTA, GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA E DIRITTO COMUNITARIO 142 
(1992). 
30 See G. Amato, The European Convention: First Achievements and Open Dilemmas, 1 INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 361 (2003). 
31 See, for instance, T. Risse, Neofunctionalism, European Identity, and the Puzzles of European Integration, 
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 291 (2005). See also E. B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, 
SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES 1950-1957 (1958). For more, see also T. A. Börzel, Mind the Gap! European 
Integration Between Level and Scope, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 217 (2005). 
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participants in the two discourses cross the green 
line dividing the room more often.32  
 
The two opposite forces are well represented by two images: the network, to justify 
the integration necessity, and the image of the discourse, to represent the form of 
participative democracy, shaped on the Habermasian idea of deliberative 
democracy, as the ideal development of Kant’s conception of Perpetual Peace.33  
 
E. Integration (Through Networks) and Democracy (Through Discourse)34 
 
As discussed above, it is possible to find at least two conceptions of cooperation, 
the network classification and that of communicative power. That is to say, as a 
contribution to the possible ways of cooperation amongst European institutions, 
Member States, and citizens, in the European context, it is possible to build a sort of 
theoretical frame. On the one hand, through the metaphor of networks, it is 
possible to understand how the dynamics in the European context can be 
interrelated without a hierarchical structure, in a way in which public and private 
barriers are vanishing, as a result of horizontal relationships amongst the actors. On 
the other hand, the deliberative democracy sums up the language in which the 
actors of the network can communicate, that is to say through a transparent and 
open dialogue. 
 
The exchange of information by way of regulation in a networked system was first 
studied by A. M. Slaughter.35 Such a phenomenon took its origin from the 
European Community foundation, in 1957, when Member States were requested to 
transfer government powers to central European institutions, but chose to leave 
implementation and enforcement of European norms to their national 
administrations.  
                                            
32 P. CRAIG & G. DE BÚRCA (eds.), THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 50 (1999). See also, S. ANDERSEN & K. ELIASSEN 
(eds.), THE EUROPEAN UNION: HOW DEMOCRATIC IS IT? (1996); J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: 
BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN (1975); P. CRAIG & C. HARLOW, LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(1998). 
33 I. KANT, ZUM EWIGEN FRIEDEN: EIN PHILOSOPHISCHER ENTWURF (1795). See also V. GERHARDT, IMMANUEL 
KANTS ENTWURF “ZUM EWIGEN FRIEDEN,” EINE TEORIE DER POLITIK (1995). With respect to the influence of 
Kant’s conception of Perpetual Peace and Habermas theories, see R. Alexy, Basic Rights and Democracy in 
Habermas’s Procedural Paradigm of the Law, 2 RATIO JURIS (1994); N. Bobbio, Scienza del diritto ed analisi del 
linguaggio (1950), in DIRITTO E ANALISI DEL LINGUAGGIO (U. Scarpelli, ed., 1976). 
34 For more details, see P. Craig, The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy, and Legitimacy, in THE 
EVOLUTION OF EU LAW (P. Craig & G. De Búrca eds., 1999). 
35 A. M. SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 40, 43 (2004). See also E. Chiti, The Emergence of a Community 
Administration, C.M.L. REV. 329 (2000). 
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“More and more, international cooperation is occurring through networks of 
government regulators that exchange information, develop common regulatory 
standards and assist one another in enforcing such standards.”36  Therefore, the 
transgovernmental network is a system in which power is not located in a 
hierarchical system, but rather in “a set of relatively stable relationships which are 
of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature between a variety of corporate 
actors.”37 
 
In order to understand how appropriate the network metaphor is to explain the 
new trends of European legal system i.e. increasing globalisation, the tendency 
towards decentralisation, and the vanishing barriers of private and public law, it 
seems useful to focus on some of the characteristics of the concept: 
 
1.  the concept refers to bodies that exercise both 
private and public powers;  
 
2.  the level of institutionalization in the network 
system is low;  
the heart of the network system is the links 
between the various bodies;  
 
3.  networks are institutions regulating the 
interactions among subjects;  
 
4.  networks facilitate the development of 
behavioral standards and working practices.38  
 
                                            
36 The multiplicity of meanings hidden behind the Net-metaphor can be used it as an instrument to 
disclose the best way to assess the effectiveness of the legal system.  C. Möllers, Netzwerk als Kategorie des 
Organisationsrechts, in DEZENTRALE NICHT-NORMATIVE STEUERUNG (J. Oebbecke ed., 2005); see also R. 
WOLFRUM, VORBEITENDE WILLENSBILDUNG UND ENTSCHEIDUNGSPROZEß BEIM ABSCHLUß MULTILATERAL 
VÖLKERRECHTLICHER VERTRÄGE (2001). 
37 T. Börzel, Policy Networks – A New Paradigm of European Governance?, EUI WORKING PAPERS, RSC 97/19 5 
(1997); Chiti, supra note 28 at 339; F. Van Waarden, European Harmonization of National Regulatory Styles?, 
in COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 95 (J.A.E. Vervaele, et. al. eds., 1999). 
38 Chiti, supra note 28 at 329. See also G. Majone, The New European Agencies: Regulation By Information, 42 
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 262 (1997); K. Hanf & L. J. O'Toole, Revisiting Old Friends: Networks, 
Implementation Structures and the Management of Inter-organizational Relations, 21 (1/2) EUROPEAN JOURNAL 
OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 163 (1992); G. Jordan & K. Schubert, (eds.), Policy networks, 21 (1/2) EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 187 (1992). 
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It has been said that the general optimism about the network system coexists with a 
certain level of frustration: first, there is really no agreement on how to define 
policy networks. Second, it seems difficult to utilize the concept to move beyond 
mere description and into the more interesting field of policy explanation.39 
 
There seems to be general agreement in the literature that the strength of the 
concept lies in its descriptive value and yet there are serious shortcomings when it 
comes to explaining policy change, because such networks are but one component 
to explaining policy outcomes:  
as a descriptive category, the network concept is useful because it indicates the 
hybridity of transnational administrative cooperation between formalization and 
informality, between consensus and majoritarian decisionmaking of the participant 
states, and between public and private law mechanisms. But more than an analytic 
framework cannot be delivered by the network concept.40 
 
As noted above, a second model of cooperation, deeply connected with the first 
one, is inspired by Habermas’s discourse theory on democracy.41 Habermas’s 
“principle of democracy” (or “democratic principle”) is a particularization of the 
discourse principle. Whereas the discourse principle addresses the justification of 
the action norm in general, the democratic principle concerns only the justification 
of the legal norms that are to govern a particular community: “the democratic 
principle states that only those laws may claim legitimacy that can meet with the 
assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation, which in turn has been 
legally constituted.”42 
 
In this context, Habermas has developed a notion called the “communicative 
concept of power.”  The explanation of this conception can be found in an 
interesting study by H. Baxter, where he observed that the precondition of the so 
                                            
39 J. Blom-Hansen, A “New Institutional” Perspective on Policy Networks, 75 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 669 
(1997), according to which: “defining policy networks seems to be a never-ending story.” 
40 Möllers, supra note 36, at 387. 
41 See J. HABERMAS, DISCOURSE ETHICS: NOTES ON A PROGRAM OF PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION 65 (1990). 
The essential implications of this theory can be summarized as follows: equal participation of all who are 
affected; the postulate of unlimitedness, i.e. the fundamental unboundedness and openness concerning 
time and persons; the postulate of freedom from constraint (Zwangslosigkeit), i.e., the freedom, in 
principle, of discourse from accidental and structural forms of power; and the postulate of seriousness or 
authenticity (Ernsthaftigkeit), i.e., the absence of deception and even illusion in expressing intentions and 
in performing speech acts. 
42 J. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND 
DEMOCRACY 111 (1998). 
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called “jurisgenerative” power of the citizens43 is the existence of “undeformed 
public spheres of political discussion that are linked to the formal institutions in 
which law is made.”  Cite.  In turn, the precondition for undeformed public spheres 
is a “vibrant” civil society, or network of voluntary associations that are 
autonomous from state control.44 In this sense, Habermas’s idea of democracy 
involves much more than formal governmental institutions and periodic voting 
rituals. It requires broad, active, and ongoing participation by the citizenry. By 
means of participation, it is possible to influence the exercise of administrative 
power. Also, legitimate law, in Habermas’s view, is both the product of democratic 
lawmaking and the mechanisms that define the structures of official command and 
obedience that Habermas terms administrative power. 
 
Law, in other words, is a mechanism for effecting and regulating “the conversion of 
communicative into administrative power: legitimate law is generated from 
communicative power and the latter in turn is converted into administrative power 
via legitimately enacted law.”45 In such a context, the general discourse principle 
operates differently in different kinds of discourse: moral, ethical and pragmatic.46 
 
From the point of view of ethical political discourse, the content of discourse theory 
is not to require consensus as to the substantive norm in question, but instead, 
discourse as to the lawmaking procedures through which consensus is to take 
place.  
 
Natural objections to this second model include problems of guaranteeing rights 
and democratic accountability in practice, in a system centred on government by 
bureaucrats. Both network and discourse theories risk remaining purely in the 
abstract, because of an inability to find an effective application.47 Hence the attempt 
of European democracies to put into practice the aspiration to a democratic model. 
 
                                            
43 H. Baxter, Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 50 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW 266 (2002). The 
terms “jurisgenesis” and “jurisgenerative,” he notes, are most closely associated with the work of Robert 
Cover. See R. M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 4, 11, 25, (1983). 
44 For Habermas’s conception of civil society as a network of voluntary associations, see HABERMAS supra 
note 42, at 175, 358, 359 and 367. 
45 HABERMAS, supra note 42, at 169. 
46 J. HABERMAS, In the Pragmatic, Ethical, and Moral Employments of Practical Reason, in JUSTIFICATION AND 
APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS 50 (C. P. Cronin, trans., 1993). 
47 It is worth to noting, however, that the network model has had good results in cooperation between 
competition authorities. See S. Roebling, T. Ryan & L. Sjöblom, The International Competition Network 
(ICN) Two Years On: Concrete Results of a Virtual Network, 3 COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER 37 (2003). 
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F. An Example to Put Into Practice the Instances of Democracy:  The 
Proportionality Principle 
 
I. Federalism as the Right Direction To Be Followed 
 
The quest for legitimacy can be satisfied through the application of subsidiarity and 
proportionality principles by the Constitutional Courts of the Member States 
themselves. In particular, it is interesting to analyze the German model, where the 
principles originated, and the Italian model, where they have been applied. That 
these principles are subject to the possibility of judicial review, in fact, can provide 
an example of making them effective, which in turn leads to greater enforceability.  
 
Both principles took origin in a Federal system, wherein different types of political 
issues that need different types of institutions to address them coexist. Some affect 
only a local area, while others are more widespread in their scope. The institutions 
of government should reflect this. The idea that government should be based solely 
on strong central institutions is out-of-date. In a federal system, the power to deal 
with an issue is held by institutions at a level as local as possible, only as central as 
necessary. This is the famous principle of subsidiarity. The second major feature of 
a federal system is that it is democratic. Each level of government has its own direct 
relationship with the citizens. Its laws apply directly to the citizens and not solely to 
the constituent states. In a federal system, power is dispersed, but coordinated. For 
this reason, federalism is often seen as a mean of protecting pluralism and the 
rights of the individual against an over-powerful government.48 
 
With the above explanation, Richard Laming, a member of the Executive 
Committee of Federal Union, introduced the main features which characterize a 
“federalist Union.”  As a result of the temporary halt to the European process, 
Laming sought to encourage and reinvigorate the resumption of the 
implementation of this vision for Europe.  This would require the joint effort of 
Europe in its entirety, each Member State’s legal system, and its citizens.  The 
common sentiment is that Europe presently requires “an injection of democracy, 
with terms of reference, which can be discussed in detail without all too soon 
coming up against the boundaries of the field of competence in question, within 
which pan-European public opinion can be formed and within which it is 
accountable to the European public with regard to the fulfilment of its tasks.”49 
                                            
48 R. Laming, An Introduction to Dederalism, 1 FEDERAL UNION (2003), available at 
www.federalunion.org.uk. 
49 U. Fastenrath, The EU As a Federal Commonwealth, in GOVERNING EUROPE UNDER A CONSTITUTION 414 
(H. J. Blanke &  S. Mangiameli eds., 2006); R. Kwiecień, The Primacy of European Union Law over National 
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Of great interest will be the analysis of the pivotal German system from which the 
principle was derived and transferred to article 3b of the EU Treaty.  Then, as a 
sample of the so-called “descendant phase of communitarian law” (that is, the 
application of EC law into domestic law), a study of the Italian system, where 
subsidiarity and proportionality principles are now expressly “constitutional 
principles” will follow.  
 
In order to understand the mechanisms of the proportionality principle, the 
situation in Germany will be described. Here, according to the federal principle, the 
subsidiarity principle has developed and followed two main directions.  First, it 
appears in the relationship between EU and national powers, and second, 
according to the same logic, it appears in the relationship between the Bund 
(Federation) and the Länder (States).50 
 
The second part of this paper will examine the Italian model, where quite contrary 
to the proportionality principle, the subsidiarity principle is explicitly referred to as 
the relationship between the State and the Regions. The principle of subsidiarity 
here has been introduced to allocate the administrative functions (Art. 118 cost.), 
according to the provisions under Art. 117 Cost., which deals with the division of 
legislative powers. 
 
As will be explained, these functions must now be carried out by the institutions 
“closest to the citizens […] unless they are attributed to the provinces, metropolitan 
cities and regions, or to the State, pursuant to the principles of subsidiarity, 
differentiation, and proportionality, to ensure their uniform implementation.”51 
Except for a generic reference to the necessity of respecting “communitarian 
principles,” no mention is made of the relationship between the EU and State. 
Moreover, there is another fundamental difference. The Italian system, unlike the 
German one, is not quite a federal system. Italy’s Regions do not effectively have 
legislative powers, as the German Länder do.   Italian Regions indeed have their 
own legislative competences, as set out in Article 117 of the Constitution, but there 
                                                                                                                
Law under the Constitutional Treaty, 6 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL: SPECIAL ISSUE –UNITY OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTION 11 (2005). 
50 For an extensive bibliography on German public and administrative reforms, see K. Stern, Der moderne 
Staat: Aufgaben, Grenzen und reformgedanken, TEORIA DEL DIRITTO E DELLO STATO: RIVISTA EUROPEA DI 
CULTURA E SCIENZA GIURIDICA 216 (2002). 
51 For this and a further bibliography, see T. Groppi & N. Scattone, Italy: the Subsidiarity Principle, 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 131 (2006); C. Tubertini, Public Administration in the 
Light of the New Title V of the Italian Constitution, 12 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 35 (2006). 
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is no strong characterization of a branch of Parliament, as is the case for the 
Bundesrat in Germany, where representative members of Regions can actively 
participate in the decision-making processes of the State’s legislative acts. 
 
The two models, German and Italian, will then be compared to Art. 3B of EU 
Treaty, which clarifies the role played by the Community. Here, subsidiarity 
encompasses only the relationship between EU and Member States.  Other local 
entities are seemingly forgotten.  
 
By collating and comparing the relevant constitutional provisions, both European 
and national, different nuances of the subsidiarity principle may be derived. Three 
relate to administrative functions, whilst one relates to the legislative.  They are as 
follows: 
 
1.  subsidiarity in the case of action of the 
Community and inaction of the Member State (Art. 
3B Treaty); 
 
2.  subsidiarity in the case of action of the 
Community and inaction of local entities (Art. 23 
GG); 
 
3.  subsidiarity in the case of action of the State and 
inaction of local Government (Art. 72 GG and Art. 
118 Cost. It.); and 
 
4.  subsidiarity as a legislative parameter in order 
to guarantee not only “executive” competences, 
but also legislative participation (Art. 23-24 GG).52 
 
The proportionality principle and, more generally, the aspirations that give rise to 
the subsidiarity principle, are still considered fundamental concepts that regulate 
any federalist system and generally indicate the guidelines of “common 
administrative law,” which refuses the logic of hierarchy between national and 
European levels.  
 
In this regard, it has been observed that administrative proceedings can be divided 
into three components: “the national, the supranational, and the infra-national, . . . 
                                            
52 For detailed descriptions of subsidiarity models, see M. NETTESHEIM & P. SCHIERA (eds.), DER 
INTEGRIERTE STAAT: VERFASSUNGS- UND EUROPARECHTLICHE BETRACHTUNGEN AUS ITALIENISCHER UND 
DEUTSCHER PERSPEKTIVE (1999). 
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[m]any are familiar with the first two, but the third, the infra-national element, 
which is constituted by horizontal dialogue among national administrations, is less 
known.”53 
 
The above-mentioned dialogue can assume different connotations.  To understand 
whether, and in what way one may note these multilevel administrations of public 
matters, it is necessary to investigate whether the different national principles may 
be read in a synoptic way. It is critically important to understand how the 
subsidiarity principle has been translated in national sources of law. Two examples 
will therefore be analyzed: the German constitutional system, artificer and creator 
of the principle, having given impulse to the “ascendant phase” of the concept; and 
the Italian system, where the principle, in the Constitutional Law of 10 October 
2001, n. 3, was recognized at a Constitutional level at the end of the so-called 
“descendant phase.”   
 
G. German Constitution: Federalism and Standards For Allocating Competences 
Amongst Bund and Länder 
 
I. The Federation and the States: Arts. 23, 24, 28-34, 37 GG 
 
 The primary point of departure when studying German administrative law from a 
European comparative perspective, is an analysis of the Grundgesetz (GG-(Basic 
Law for the Federal Republic of Germany). It was promulgated, as known, on May 
23rd, 1949 (first issue of the Federal Law Gazette), and as amended up to and 
including December 20th, 1993.54  
                                            
53 S. Cassese, European Administrative Proceedings, 68 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 21 (2004). 
54 For an overview of the Federal Republic of Germany’s roots, see L. Watts and P. Hobson, Fiscal 
Federalism in Germany, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, 
Canada and Department of Economics, Acadia University, Wolvifille, Nova Scotia, Canada, 2000: “The 
Federal Republic of Germany established in 1949 has historical roots in earlier experience of the German 
Empire (1871-1918), the Weimar Republic (1919-34), the failure of the totalitarian centralization of the 
third Reich (1934-35), and the immediate postwar influence of the allied occupying powers. In 1949, the 
Länder of West Germany became the Federal Republic of Germany. Thirty one years later, the 
reunification of Germany in 1990 provided for the accession of five new Länder from had previously 
been the Democratic Republic of Germany.” One of the first authors, to recognize the importance of then 
new concept of federalism in the BundesStaat, even if he referred to a period antecedent to the 
Grundgesetz, was G. JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE (1929). On the conceptualization of sovereignty 
in Jellinek and also in the Kelsen studies see the recent work of S. Griller, The Impact of the Constitution for 
Europe on National Sovereignty, in A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE: THE IGC, THE RATIFICATION PROCESS AND 
BEYOND 160 (I. Pernice & J. Zemanek eds.,2005). For a detailed introduction to the Jellinek study, see V. E. 
ORLANDO, GIORGIO JELLINEK E LA STORIA DEL DIRITTO PUBBLICO GENERALE (1949).  See also H. Meibom, Die 
Wirkung der Mitgliedstaaten in der Rechtsetzung der EWG, in ZUR STELLUNG DER MITGLIEDSTAATEN IM 
EUROPARECHT (H. Bülek ed., 1967); H. E. BIRKE, DIE DEUTSCHEN BUNDESLÄNDER IN DEN EUROPÄISCHEN 
GEMEINSCHAFTENM (1973).   
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Art. 23 of the GG (“The European Union”), which concerns the organization of 
different levels of power, reads:  
 
1. With a view to establishing a united Europe, the 
Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in 
the development of the European Union that is 
committed to democratic, social, and federal 
principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle 
of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of 
protection of basic rights essentially comparable to 
that afforded by the Basic Law. To this end the 
Federation may transfer sovereign powers with the 
consent of Bundesrat […]. 2. The Bundestag and, 
through the Bundesrat, the Länder shall participate 
in matters concerning the European Union. […]. 
4.The Bundesrat shall participate in the decision-
making process of the Federation insofar as it 
would have been competent to do so in a 
comparable domestic matter, or insofar as the 
subjects falls within domestic competence of the 
Länder. 5. Insofar, in an area within the exclusive 
competence of the Federation, interests of the 
Länder are affected, and in other matters, insofar 
as the Federation has legislative power, the Federal 
Government shall take the position of the 
Bundesrat into account. To the extent that the 
legislative powers of the Länder, the structure of 
Land authorities, or Land administrative 
procedures are primarily affected, the position of 
the Bundesrat shall be given the greatest possible 
respect in determining the Federation’s position 
consistent with its responsibility of the Federation 
for the nation as a whole […].  6. When legislative 
power exclusive to the Länder is primarily 
affected, the exercise of the rights belonging to the 
Federal Republic of Germany as a member state of 
the European Union shall be exercised with the 
participation and the concurrence of the Federal 
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Government; their exercise shall be consistent of 
the Bundesrat.55 
 
Before analyzing the administrative structure outlined in Article 32 above, it is 
important to note that in 1992, due to the influence of  the Maastricht Treaty and, 
more particularly, of the subsidiarity clause in Art. 5 (ex Art. 3B), the German 
Constitution was significantly amended. The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
was likewise preceded by an amendment of the constitutional provisions in order 
to reserve to the Federation some exclusive powers in matters  related to currency.56  
But, as has been observed “besides the amendment of monetary provisions, 
Germany also introduced a general clause confirming participation in a unified 
Europe, and on the delegation of State competences in this respect (Art. 23), as well 
as a number of amendments concerning various specific aspects of EU 
membership.”57 
 
Many German authors have discussed the necessary amendment of the German 
Constitution together with the affirmation of the subsidiarity principle at a 
Constitutional level.  In particular, Prof. R. Streinz, commenting on Art. 23 GG, 
notes that the subsidiarity principle chiefly aims to encompass the exercise of 
devolution and to narrow down the powers in cases of non-exclusive subjects of the 
Community. The clause sets out the unique, dual relationship that exists between 
Member States and the Community as follows:  
 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only 
if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the 
                                            
55 With respect to the revision of the Constitution after the reunification of the two Germanies in 1990, see 
G.H. Gornig & S. Reckewerth, The Revision of the German Basic Law: Current Perspectives and Problems in 
German Constitutional Law, PUBLIC LAW 137, 144 (1997), who observe on Article 23: “the new Article 23 
B.L. deals extensively with the participation of German national and state organs in the affairs of the 
European Union. In the final analysis, it was the states (Länder) that played the predominant role in 
shaping the new provision, particularly the wording which makes German participation in European 
unification contingent upon the principles of federalism and subsidiarity and which offers to the states 
rights to participate directly, as a compensation for the loss of other state (Länder) powers.” 
56 See, infra, Section G, III, the analysis of fiscal federalism. 
57On this aspect, see also H. Beckendorf, Neuere Entwicklungen in der Bildungspolitik der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft, 2 NVWZ  125 (1993). 
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scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community.58  
 
The challenge was therefore the manner in which the provisions of Art. 3 B would 
be enlarged to include the various components of “Member State” that would 
realize the Länder’s legislative aspirations and consequently their will to exercise 
administrative powers.  
 
Central and innate to Germany is its “federal” constitution.  This was the 
compelling issue that made it necessary to involve the interested components of the 
State so that the European institutions would also be involved in the decision-
making process.  The Länder themselves were keen on the subsidiarity principle 
and ought to have been included to play a new and important role at a 
Constitutional level.  
 
Despite the complexity of the discussion, it led to important results.  Hence, the 
framework of the German Constitution in relation to the federal powers changed.59 
First of all, the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany  in the 
development of Europe was clearly characterized by the subsidiarity principle, 
which is now a valuable constitutional principle set up to delimit the borders of EU 
and State power (Art. 23, para 1).  
 
Secondly, the entire content of Art. 23 GG seems to be a logical consequence of the 
subsidiarity principle. This impression emerges from the formal structure of the 
article.  No mention is made of the European Union’s intervention. On the contrary, 
what has been clearly underlined is the central role of the Federal Republic, its 
organization of powers in Bundestag, Bundesrat, and Länder, all of which, 
together,  participate in the decision-making process by transferring their power to 
the Union (See para 2: “The Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, the Länder 
shall participate in matters concerning the European Union. The Federal 
Government shall take the position of the Bundestag into account during 
negotiations”).  Deeply connected with the above-noted provision is Art. 50 GG, 
which remarkably declares the relationship between the Länder and the Bundesrat 
                                            
58 E. di Salvatore, Integrazione europea e regionalismo: l’esempio tedesco, in DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMPARATO E 
EUROPEO 518 (2001), who notably recollects the Länder’s keen desire for the subsidiarity principle even 
though their proposal was not precisely accepted and Art. 3 B had content different from what they 
really wanted, excluding de facto the role of Länder themselves.  
59 On Art. 23 GG’s amendment see S. Hölscheidt & T. Schotten, Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union als 
Anwendungsfall des neuen Europaartikels 23 GG?, 5 DIE ÖFFENTLICHE 187 (1995); W. Fischer, Die 
Europäischen Union im Grundgesetz: der Neue Artikel 23, ZPARL. 32 (1993); F. Wilhelm, Europa im 
Grundgesetz: Der Neue Artikel 23, BAYVBL 705 (1992). 
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as follows: “the Länder shall participate through the Bundesrat in the legislation 
and administration of the Federation and in matters concerning the European 
Union.”60  
 
Thirdly, the participation of the Länder has two main levels of protection--in the 
event Länder interests are infringed or when their exclusive legislative competence 
is undermined. Within the exclusive competence of the Federation, should the 
interests of Länder be affected, the Federal Government would take the position of 
the Bundesrat into account. Moreover, at the second level, which is a clear 
expression of subsidiarity, if the Länder’s exclusive legislative powers are 
fundamentally infringed, then the exercise of power shall be delegated to a 
representative of the Länder as designated by the Bundesrat. 
 
In other words, it is clear that the structure of Art. 23 GG is built according to the 
logic of subsidiarity.   Highest respect is paid to the Land, which is the object of 
protection and towards which the European Union shall guarantee “subsidium,” its 
own protection. It is interesting to note what authors and case law say of the 
concept of “devolution” (Übertragung).  This concept ought not to be understood 
literally as a “transfer” of power.  Rather, it should to be understood as a logical 
consequence of the necessity to integrate different powers.  Subsidiarity does not 
deal with hierarchy, but with a multilevel perspective.  
 
A unilateral transfer of powers from one level to another may not be accepted.61 
This constitutional provision could be sufficient to reveal the essence of subsidiarity 
and its deep connection with democracy.  Similarly, other examples illustrate this 
relationship.  Particularly indicative of the Land’s power is the provision of Article 
28 GG, which promises the “[f]ederal guarantee of Land constitutions and of local 
self-government.”  Here, it is possible to find the constitutive principles of Land 
government, with provision of a representative body chosen in general, free, equal, 
and secret elections. Moreover, the “Öffnungsklausel” (opening clause) invites the 
concept of “European citizenship“ by allowing citizens of any member state of the 
European Community to be elected in accordance with European law. It is evident 
that the Öffnungsklausel is a suitable measure to deter the risk of excessive 
“parochialism.”62 
 
                                            
60 Article 51, on “Composition,“ outlines the effective make up of the Bundesrat. See C. Hillgruber, 
German Federalism – An Outdated Relict? 6 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL (2005).   
61 R. Streinz, Sub Art. 23 GG cit., 958; BVerGE 37, 271, 279. For an analysis of the judgment, see J.A. 
Frowein, Das Maastricht-Urteil und die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, ZAÖRV 1 (1994).  
62 M. Nierhaus, Sub Art. 28, in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 1040 (M. Sachs ed., 2003). 
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The self-regulation of local affairs is guaranteed by a financial autonomy that, 
according to constitutional principles, is based on the right of municipalities to a 
portion of tax revenues upon their jurisdiction and upon the right to establish the 
rates at which these sources shall be taxed.  
It is worth briefly noting that local government is the lowest of the three levels of 
the administrative system within Germany, which can be broken down as follows: 
federal, state (Länder) and local level. The local level is then subdivided into 
counties (Kreise) and municipalities or communes (Gemeinde).63  
 
As has been observed, with regard to Art. 28 GG: “Local government in Germany 
has a comparatively strong constitutional position. According to Article 28 of the 
Federal Constitution, communes enjoy local autonomy […] and neither federal nor 
state government is allowed to intervene within this sphere.”64 It is important to 
recall that Article 28 GG is the outcome of a more complex reform of the fiscal part 
of the German Basic Law65 in which all revenue sharing rules are contained in Art. 
106, entitled “Apportionment of Tax Revenue.”   
 
In Germany’s federal system, an efficient administration aims, firstly, to guarantee 
that legislative power lies at the federal level with the effective cooperation of 
Länder through their representative members in the Bundesrat. Secondly, a federal 
system aims to organize administrative power at the Land level.  Therefore, as a 
summation of fiscal federalism, it is possible to say with respect to the subsidiarity 
principle that the Basic Law distinguishes between the right of each level of 
government to legislate on specific taxes and the right to appropriate the proceeds 
of taxes. The exclusive federal power to legislate on taxes is in practice restricted to 
customs, duties and fiscal monopolies (Art. 105 1). The power to legislate on all 
taxes wherefrom the revenue is shared is concurrently held.  The Länder can 
therefore use the Federal Bundesrat as their vehicle for shaping federal tax 
legislation. 
 
On the whole, Federal Law in a certain way “boasts priority” over Land legislation.  
The footprints of this trend may be found in Art. 31 GG, which states: “Federal law 
shall take precedence over Land law” (the so called Kollisionsnorm). In case of a 
conflict between the Bund’s and the Land’s law, the general federal interest should 
prevail.66  
                                            
63 For further details, see C. Reichard, Local Public Management Reforms in Germany, 81 PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 345 (2003). 
64 Id. at 347. 
65 For further detail, see Nierhaus supra note 62 at 1061. 
66 P. M. Huber, Sub Art. 31, in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 1100 (M. Sachs ed., 2003). 
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Article 32, concerning “Foreign Relations,” is also remarkable.  It reads: “1. 
Relations with foreign states shall be conducted by the federation.” It further 
outlines the right of the Land to be consulted. Insofar as the Länder have power to 
legislate, they can conclude foreign treaties only after the consent of the Federal 
Government.67 
 
Nevertheless, even if the general conception of public administration is strongly 
centralized (although it is worth underscoring that in Germany’s federal system, 
the Länder have effective participation in the Bundesrat), it is significant that 
general public principles of good administration are expressly referred to the 
Land’s administration. Therefore, Article 33 affirms equality of rights and duties 
with respect to the Land: “1. Every German shall have in every Land the same 
political rights and duties.”  
 
The process of constructing a “good administration” is another result of the pivotal 
role of the Länder and of the effective cooperation between them and the Federal 
administration.  This refers to the necessity of cooperation in cases of natural 
disasters or accidents, with the provision for collaborative assistance between all 
federal and Land authorities (Art. 35 “Legal and Administrative Assistance, 
Assistance During Disasters”). The cooperation amongst the Länder is known as 
”Dritte Ebene,” the third level of  federalism.  This means that beyond the Länder 
and Bund levels, there is a recognized sphere of action in which all Länder should 
cooperate.68  
 
II.  Federal Legislative Powers: Arts. 70-74 
 
Chapter VII of the German Constitution, and more precisely, Articles 70 through 
82, sets out in detail the functioning of Federal Legislation with a clear separation of 
the exclusive legislative power of the Federation (Art. 71), and of the concurrent 
legislative power (Art. 72), respectively followed by the numbering of subjects of 
exclusive legislative power (Art. 73), and by the numbering of subjects of 
concurrent legislation (Art. 74). 
 
                                            
67 J. Bauer & M. Hartwig, Verträge der Länder des Bundesrepublik Deutschland mit ausländichen Staaten über 
Fragen der Kommunalen Zusammenarbeit, NWVBL 41 (1994). For further information, see also R. Streinz, 
Sub Art. 32, in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 1111 (M. Sachs ed., 2003).   
68 F. OSSENBÜHL, Föderalismus und Regionalismus in Europa. Landesbericht Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in 
ID., op. cit., 140; see also W. ERBGUTH, Sub Art. 35, in M. SACHS, (eds.) Grundgesetz Kommentar, cit., 1196. 
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According to Article 70 “Division of Legislative Powers Between the Federation 
and the Länder”: “1. The Länder shall have the right to legislate insofar as this Basic 
Law does not confer legislative power to the Federation. 2. The division of 
authority between the Federation and the Länder shall be governed by the 
provisions of this Basic Law respecting exclusive and concurrent legislative 
powers.” In this regard, it is significant that Art. 70 be read and construed in 
connection with the systematic order of European Law. In a telling example, Prof. 
C. Degenhar, in particular, titles the mentioned part as “Distinction of functions 
among Bund, Länder and European Community”. This accords with the ideal “fil 
rouge” among European and national competencies.69 Article 70 unquestionably 
expresses a strong necessity to give voice to the instance of democracy.  
 
As mentioned, Art. 72 GG describes the so-called “concurrent legislative powers of 
the Federation and the Länder.”  This follows as a logical consequence the affirmed 
“exclusive legislative power of Federation” in Art. 71. The article, amended in 1994, 
reads as follows: “1. On matters within the concurrent legislative power, the Länder 
shall have power to legislate so long and to the extent that the Federation has not 
exercised its legislative power by enacting a law. 2. The Federation shall have the 
right to legislate on these matters if and to the extent that the establishment of equal 
living conditions throughout the federal territory or the maintenance of legal or 
economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the national interest […].”  
 
As it has been affirmed, in Article 72 (2), it is easy to recognize “an expression of the 
principle of subsidiarity with which European law has made us familiar.”70 In 
agreement with G. Taylor’s comments, it should be recognized that the Federal 
competence is organized into two levels: the subsidiarity principle and the so-called 
“subject-matter competence.” But Art. 72 has played a decisive role in the 
affirmation of federalism as recently as October 2002, when the German Federal 
Constitutional Court decided its first case under the amended statutory provisions.  
 
The case law will be more fully analyzed below.  Presently, however, it is important 
to underline the admission of a judicial review on criteria listed in paragraph 2, 
which delimits the Federal legislative power on concurrent matters “if and to the 
extent that the establishment of equal living conditions throughout the federal 
                                            
69 C. Degenhart, Sub Art. 70 GG, in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 1496 (M. Sachs ed., 2003). 
70 G. Taylor, Germany: The Subsidiarity Principle, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115 
(2006). On Art. 72, see E. Buoso, L’art. 72, II comma GG davanti al Bundesverfassungsgericht, 5 LE REGIONI 959 
(2003), which also provides an excellent bibliography. 
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territory or the maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation 
necessary in the national interest.”71  
 
Looking through Articles 73 and 74, it is notable that the “edge criterion” of 
competences is based on subjects, with the provision of “areas of federal framework 
legislation.” 
  
In conclusion, it is important to remember that the federal structure of the German 
State is guaranteed by the so-called “eternity clause” of Art. 79 para 3, prohibiting 
amendments which would abolish the Länder. It provides: “[a]mendments to the 
Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation 
on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 
20 shall be inadmissible.”  
 
III.  Execution of Statutes and Federal Administration (Arts. 83-91 GG) and Joint tasks 
(Arts. 91a and 91b) 
 
The entire corpus of provisions governing federalism are fulfilled by a few 
legislative prescriptions relating to administrative functions. The same federal and 
subsidiarity logic that governs legislative matters is centred on the distribution of 
authority between the Federation and the Länder. Examples of this include the 
following: 
 
1.  Art. 83 reads that “The Länder shall execute 
federal laws in their own right insofar as the Basic 
Law does not otherwise provide or permit;” 
 
2.  Articles 87 to 91 list the subjects of federal 
administration.  the Federation executes laws 
through its own administrative authorities or 
through federal corporations or institutions 
established under public law pertaining to all these 
subjects.  
 
Finally, Articles 91a and 91b relate to the possibility of cooperation between the 
Federation and the Länder in promoting research institutions and research projects 
of supra-regional importance. 
                                            
71 Taylor, supra note 70 at 116; M. Herdegen, After the TV Judgement of the German Constitutional Court: 
Decision-making Within the EU Council and the German Länder, C.M.L. REV 1369 (1995). 
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The Federal Constitutional Court therefore plays a decisive role, as the “watchdog” 
of all Constitutional provisions and rules on the interpretation of the Basic Law: 
 
-  in the event of disputes concerning the rights 
and duties of a supreme federal bodies;  
-  in the event of disagreement or doubts 
respecting the formal or substantive compatibility 
of federal law or Land law with the Basic Law;  
-  in the event of disagreements whether a law 
meets the requirements of paragraph 82 of Article 
72, on application of the Bundesrat or of the 
Government or legislature of a Land; 
-  in the event of disagreement respecting the rights 
and duties of the federation and the Länder 
especially in execution of federal law by the 
Länder and in the exercize of federal oversights 
and on other dispute involving public law between 
Federation and the Länder; 
-  on constitutional complaints, that can be filed by 
any person alleging that one of his basic rights has 
been infringed by a public authority, and also on 
constitutional complaints filed by municipalities or 
associations of municipalities on the ground that 
their right to self government has been infringed 
under Article 28;  
-  in the case of infringement by a Land law; 
however, only if the law cannot be challenged in 
the constitutional court of the Land.72 
 
The sub-topic that follows shall compare the new formula and the way the German 
Constitutional Court uses it, to the Italian approach 
 
H. The Italian Constitution:  New Title V. Subsidiarity clause Between State and 
Regions 
 
I.  Legislative Competences and Subsidiarity Principles in Administrative Functions 
 
The influence of Art. 3B of the EU Treaty on the Italian Constitutional system was 
felt in 2001 when the Constitutional Law n. 3, 18 October 2001 enshrined the 
                                            
72 L. Woelk, La Germania. Il difficile equilibrio tra unitarietà, solidarietà e (maggiore) competizione, in 
FEDERALISMI FISCALI E COSTITUZIONI 191 (V. Atripaldi & R. Bifuclo eds., 2001). 
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subsidiarity principle as a constitutional principle. Then, the recognition was 
limited to Parliamentary Law (L. Bassanini n. 59/1997 and D. Lgs. n. 267/2000).73 
 
Although through a perusal of the list of local autonomies in Art. 114 one notes the 
revolutionary inversion of order, whereby mention is first made of Municipalities 
and Provinces, then Regions, then State, in descending order, the most important 
changes are enunciated in Articles 117 and 118.  
 
The Italian Constitution, similarly to Art. 23 GG, recognizes at the outset the 
European principles that are now explicitly at the same level as constitutional 
principles. Art. 117 (1) outlines that “legislative power belongs to the State and the 
Regions in accordance with the constitution and within the limits set by European 
Union law and international obligations.”  
 
The first evident difference, however, is that subsidiarity does not appear in Art. 
117, where the relations between States and Regions are codified. Here, for two 
main reasons, it is not possible to speak of a “pure federalist system.” Firstly, 
Regions do not participate in the decision-making process and subsidiarity is called 
for as a requirement of administrative action, not as a criterion for separating 
legislative power.74 In any case, it is easy to find the second main characteristic of a 
federal system, which is the division of subjects for legislative power of the State 
and Regions. 
 
It is worth noting that even before the revision in 2001, the Italian Constitution 
enshrined not only the principle of “unity of the State,” but also the so-called 
“decentralization” principle.  The latter principle is enunciated particularly in Art. 5 
of the Constitution “Local Autonomy:” “The Republic, one and indivisible, 
recognizes and promotes local autonomy; it fully applies administrative 
decentralization of state services and adopts principles and methods of legislation 
meeting the requirements of autonomy and decentralization.” 
 
In light of the “subsidiarity logic,” one may possibly give a new and different 
interpretation to the above-mentioned article. The point should now be the 
decentralization of functions, in respect of unity and indivisibility of the Republic, 
                                            
73 On this subject, see G. Cartei & V. Ferraro, Reform of the Fifth Title of Italian Constitution: a Step Towards a 
Federal System?, EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 445 (2002). 
74 For a comparison between Italian devolution and German federalism, see S. Mangiameli, Continuità e 
riforma della Costituzione, 2 TEORIA DEL DIRITTO E DELLO STATO, RIVISTA EUROPEA DI CULTURA E SCIENZA 
GIURIDICA 466-467 (2002). 
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whereas before the Constitutional Law n. 3/2001, the focus was on “unity and 
indivisibility of Republic.” 
 
Article 117 of the Const. confirms the attention paid to local autonomy and to the 
institutions “nearest to the citizens.” This provision first lists the subjects of 
exclusive legislative competence of the State (so-called exclusive State matters). It 
then lists defined “transversal standards,” where competences are shared between 
State and Regions, but where the State maintains the power to set out the 
framework of fundamental principles (so-called concurrent subjects). Finally, it lists 
a residual legislative competence of Regions.75 
 
Following the division of legislative powers noted above is the amended Art. 118 
Cost, which states as follows. “(1) Administrative functions belong to the 
municipalities except when they are conferred to provinces, metropolitan cities, 
regions, or the state in order to guarantee uniform practice; the assignment is based 
on the principles of subsidiarity, differentiation and adequacy. […] (4) State, 
regions, metropolitan cities, provinces and municipalities support autonomous 
initiatives promoted by citizens, individually or in associations, in order to carry 
out activities of general interest; this is based on the principle of subsidiarity.”  
What is clearly evident is the most important change relating to the 
constitutionalization of the principle of subsidiarity, as well as the emphasis given 
to differentiation and adequacy.  
 
Moreover, within the meaning of subsidiarity it is possible to distinguish two 
different forms: the first one is known as “vertical subsidiarity,” because it refers to 
levels of government that, even though not ordered in hierarchy, may in some way 
be organized in an ideal “vertical order,” as provided by Art. 114.76 The second 
construction of subsidiarity, accords with the geometrical metaphor.  This is the so-
called “horizontal subsidiarity,” noted in the last paragraph of Art. 118. Here 
relations are established at a level where State, regions, metropolitan cities, 
provinces, and municipalities are juxtaposed against the citizens, both as 
individuals and as members of associations. 
 
 In this sense, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has up to now affirmed 
that subsidiarity, at both levels, cannot operate as a mere verbal formula believed to 
                                            
75 Art. 117 (4). The Regions have exclusive legislative power with respect to any matters not expressly 
reserved to State law.”  
76 In this regard, both the jurisprudence and secondary writings have pointed out that this first 
acceptance of subsidiarity has a double meaning. See Tubertini, supra note 51 at 37; and also R. Bin, La 
funzione amministrativa nel nuovo Titolo V della Costituzione, LE REGIONI 373 (2002). 
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have magical force that would realize the division of competence between different 
levels of governance.77 On the contrary, subsidiarity requires that effective 
capacities be scrutinized and has to be combined with the “loyal cooperation” 
principle.  
 
Two challenges are evident in ensuring the effectiveness of the subsidiarity 
principle. The first concerns applying the constitutional provisions, and the second 
is finding the best instruments to coordinate the principle with the division of 
legislative and administrative competences. In respect of the first challenge, the 
legislature has attempted to provide a solution through Law No. 131 of June 5, 2003 
(“Provisions For the Adjustment of the Legal System of the Republic in 
Constitutional Law No. 3/2001”), but has been unsuccessful.  For the second 
challenge, instruments of agreements and understandings have been written, and 
committees and networks of communications created. Before concentrating on the 
current position, and on the recent approach of Constitutional Court which clearly 
demonstrates awareness of the instances of a “bottom-up subsidiarity,” it is useful 
to complete the framework, by highlighting new provisions in the financial system 
of local autonomies.  
 
Article 119 on “Financial Autonomy” provides that: “(1) Municipalities, provinces, 
metropolitan cities and regions have financial autonomy regarding revenues and 
expenditures. (2) Municipalities, provinces, metropolitan cities and regions have 
autonomous resources. They establish and implement their own taxes and 
revenues, in harmony with the constitution and in accordance with the principles of 
coordination of the public finances and the taxation system. […].” 
 
Here, just as in the German Constitution, after enumerating the legislative and 
administrative competences, the constitutional revision provides for financial 
autonomy as a logical consequence of the division of functions. But this new 
provision differs significantly from the Finanzverfassung (Constitution for Financial 
Matters) of German federalism. In Italy, the effectiveness of dispositions on fiscal 
federalism has been delegated to law.78 
  
The difficulty in giving effect to Article 119 of the Constitution is one of the reasons 
for skepticism over the revision of Title V: “Da questo punto di vista l’elaborazione 
                                            
77 See Corte Costituzionale, 1 October 2003, 6 RIV. CORTE CONTI 181 (2003). 
78 Mangiameli, supra note 74 at 478. 
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italiana è ancora indietro e la stessa applicazione dell’art. 119 Cost. sembra 
conoscere delle difficoltà insormontabili.”79 
 
I. Two Decisions Compared: The Proportionality Flips 
 
This final part will consist of a comparison of the transformation of the German and 
Italian Constitutional Courts’ attitudes toward the proportionality principle. This 
comparison will be made through an analysis of the judgment of the 
BundesverfassungGericht (BVerfGE Federal Constitutional Court) announced on 
October 24th, 200280 and a judgment of the Italian Corte Costituzionale regarding  
GMO problems. 
 
I.  German Case Law 
 
The German judgment is well-known because it is considered the German 
Constitutional Court’s first response to the amended Art. 72 GG. As noted 
previously, the 1994 amendment to Art. 72 GG introduced the possibility for 
judicial review of the discretionary power of Federal legislation. With the 2002 
judgment, the Court paved the way for the admission of an effective review of 
federal power and moreover focused its attention on the requirements of a 
legitimate intervention of the State. In its judgement, the BVerfGE refused to grant 
a judicial review on the basis of the “necessity of Federal intervention,” under the 
sphere of “discretionary power of Federal legislator.”81  
 
 The question the Court examined concerned the legitimacy of a Federal Law on 
geriatric assistance (Altenplegegesetz, AltpflG), which contained some amendments 
to the law on sanitary assistance (Krankenpflegegesetz). The State of Bavaria 
contested the new law in Court by challenging the necessity of a federal law 
dealing with a “sanitary subject,” which regulated the education and vocational 
training in case of sanitary assistance. The statute, according to the petitioners, dealt 
very generally with the training of geriatric care assistants and expressly left many 
details to the states.82 
                                            
79 Transl.: From this point of view, the Italian system is not yet completely developed and the 
effectiveness of Art. 119 Const. is seriously discussed.  
80 Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Highest Administrative Court] 24 October 2002, II Sen., 24 
available at www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen.html.  
81 BVerfGE, 2, 213 ss; 10, 234; BVerGE, 15, 127; BVerfGE, 33, 224, 229, in 
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen.html. For more information, see E. Buoso, L’art. 72, 
II comma, GG davanti al Bundesverfassungsgericht, LE REGIONI 958 (2003). 
82 Taylor, supra note 70. 
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The Constitutional Court, after having acknowledged the important amendment of 
Art. 72 GG in 1994, affirmed the necessity of considering, through a “balanced 
evaluation,” the subjects of exclusive and concurrent legislative competence.  
 
In this sense, the Court strongly affirmed that the entire sphere of legislative 
competence, including the Federal one, has to be submitted to judicial review.83 
Article 72 GG, following the amendment, refers to the “[n]ecessity” to exercise 
federal legislative power and no longer to the “Need” of a Federal regulation, as it 
was before the 1994 amendment. 
 
Beyond the external metamorphosis of the “Need-clause” (Bedürfnisklausel) into the 
“Necessity-clause” (Erforderlichkeitsklausel), the Court includes the possibility of a 
judicial review. In this way, the obstacle of discretionary power is tempered by 
instruments of proportionality.84 
 
II.  Italian Case Law 
 
Judgment n. 116/2006 of the Italian Constitutional Court is interesting, because it 
concerns the allocation of legislative competences between State and Regions in 
matters relating to GMOs (genetically modified organisms). More precisely, the 
Regione Marche contested the legitimacy of some provisions of the Decree 22 
November 2004 n. 279.85 This was in relation to the problem of co-existence 
between GMO and organic cultures, and of the effects of contamination from both 
an agricultural and an environmental point of view. The co-existence between the 
GMOs and the organic cultures refers to the ability of farmers to make a practical 
choice between conventional, organic, and GM crop production in compliance with 
the legal obligations with labelling and purity criteria. Co-existence measures 
therefore aim at protecting farmers of non-GMO crops from the possible economic 
consequences of accidentally mixing their crops with GMOs.86 The appeal focused 
                                            
83 F. Pestalozza, Sub Art. 72, Abs. 2, Rn. 1-47, in DAS BONNER GG- KOMMENTAR (H.V. Mangolt, F. Klein & F. 
Pestalozza eds.,  2002). 
84 Tansl.: Urgent provisions to solve the problem of coexistence between transgenic, conventional and 
biological cultures. For a detailed analysis of judicial review on the “Necessity-clause” see Galetta and 
Kröger, supra note 29. 
85 In coordination with Law 28 January 2005, no. 5 in G.U. n. 22 of 28 January 2005.  
86 See Commission Recommendation on 23 July 2003, available at www.europa.eu.  
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on allocations of legislative competences in order to find the best measures the 
Italian State could adopt.87 
 
In particular, the complaints were based on a statutory provision which conferred 
to the State the power to legislate, even if the contamination problem concerned not 
only a subject of exclusive legislative competence (“Tutela della salute”, a health 
safeguard), but also of concurrent competence (“Tutela dell’ambiente”, an 
environmental safeguard) and exclusive competence of Regions (agricultural 
matters).  
 
The Regione Marche asserted that the provision was vague, and conferred 
“indefinite power” to the State. The Court accepted the argument recognizing the 
lack of legitimacy of the law and affirming that the co-existence measures should 
not go beyond what is necessary to ensure that accidental traces of GMOs stay 
beyond EU labelling thresholds, in order to avoid any unnecessary burden for the 
operators concerned.  
 
Art. 3 of the Law which relates to regulation of co-existence refers to an indefinite 
State provision, whereas, to the contrary, it should have been more appropriate a 
legal provision; literally, the Court considered illegitimate the provision of a generic 
State act. 
 
Moreover, the Court stated that the further provision developing the above-noted 
“framework norms” conflicts with the Regional legislative competence in 
agricultural matters.   The Constitutional Court followed two main steps: first, in 
accordance with EU law, it recognized that, to avoid any unnecessary burden for 
the operators concerned, co-existence measures should not go beyond what is 
necessary to ensure that accidental traces of GMOs in non-GM products remain 
below EU labelling thresholds. Second, measures should be scientifically based and 
proportionate, and therefore must be adapted to local conditions. Hence, the 
necessity for the Regional power to legislate and to guarantee a proportionate 
action at the level closer to individual farms. The judgment highlights therefore a 
new attitude of constitutional jurisprudence towards decentralization by the means 
                                            
87 See S. Francescon, The New Directive 2001/18/EC on the Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified 
Organisms into the Environment: Changes and Perspectives, 10 RECIEL 309 (2001). See also M. Poto, I 
traguardi in tema di sicurezza alimentare tra ordinamento comunitario ed ordinamenti interni, in LA SICUREZZA 
ALIMENTARE TRA UNIONE EUROPEA, STATO E REGIONI DOPO LA RIFORMA DEL TITOLO V DELLA COSTITUZIONE 
(M. Poto, E. Rolando & C. Rossi eds., 2006). 
868                                                                                               [Vol. 08  No. 09  G E R M A N  L A W  J O U R N A L
of the principle of proportionality. It appears as though the Court is changing its 
course of action by reversing its previous  “State-centered” approach.88  
 
Case n. 116/2006 reflects a new orientation of the Court, which is increasingly in 
favor of a decentralization of power.  This is apparent in two cases, both decided in 
June 2006 (1 June 2006, n. 214 and 28th June 2006, n. 246).  In both decisions, the 
regional legislative competence is at last recognized, the former a case regarding 
government of territory and the latter regarding determination of levels of energy.89  
 
J. Conclusions 
 
In summary, a more effective judicial review for allocating choices is becoming 
possible, thanks to the increasing ability of the Court to do so through the lens of 
the proportionality principle. The control of proportionality is therefore used by the 
European Court of Justice and by the National Courts as an instrument to verify 
whether the choices of the Public Administration have been made properly, 
according to the criteria of subsidiarity. That is to so say, it becomes an instrument 
to gauge if power is administrated according to the logic of devolution. Brought 
forth from a German background, it has inspired the European Treaty and strongly 
influenced the Member States’ legal systems, starting with the German system itself 
and followed by the Italian, where the Constitution has been revised with the 
precise intent to give effectiveness to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
 
The difference between the two systems can be summarized in the following terms: 
whereas in Germany the trend is aided by the new formulation of proportionality 
criteria according to the amended constitutional provisions, in Italy, consolidation 
is occurring thanks to the jurisprudential channel. 
 
Let us hope that these tendencies will raise an awareness among the courts, 
legislators, and jurists of a new definition of good administration -  “one of the 
cornerstones of modern administrative law”90 in terms of the development of 
administrative law, which is closely bound up with the idea of establishing judicial 
protection as a counterweight to public power.91 The effectiveness of the principles 
                                            
88 See Corte cost., 26 luglio 2002, n. 407, in Giur. cost., 2002, 2940, with a note from F. S. Marini, La Corte 
costituzionale nel labirinto delle materie “trasversali.”  
89Both are available on the Constitutional Court’s website at www.cortecostituzionale.it. 
90T. Fortsakis, Principles Governing Good Administration, 11 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 207 (2005). 
91 As compiled by Fortsakis, id.. This list is quite similar to that collected by E. SPILIOTOPOULOS, GREEK 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW para. 82 (2004). 
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of good administration have to deal with a proper balance of powers, reachable by 
enforcing the awareness of the courts, of legislators, and of jurists. In the 
development of this awareness, the evolution of the proportionality principle is 
playing a central role. 
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